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Abstract
Riveret et al. have proposed a framework for probabilistic legal reasoning. Their goal is to
determine the chance of winning a court case, given the probabilities of the judge accepting
certain claimed facts and legal rules.
In this paper we tackle the same problem by defining and implementing a new formalism,
called probabilistic argumentation logic, which can be seen as a probabilistic generalization
of Nute’s defeasible logic. Not only does this provide an automation of the — only hand-
performed — computations in Riveret et al, it also provides a solution to one of their open
problems: a method to determine the initial probabilities from a given body of precedents.
1 Introduction
Riveret et al. (2007) have proposed a framework of probabilistic legal reasoning
based on the argumentation framework of Prakken and Sartor (1997), which provides
a dialectical proof theory in the formal setting of Dung (1995). Their goal is to
determine the chance of winning a court case, given the probabilities of the judge
accepting certain claimed facts to be valid and legal rules to be applicable.
Roth et al. (2007) tackle a similar problem, but with the focus on finding legal
strategies for the involved parties to maximize their chances of winning. They
propose a rather complex framework, based on a logic layer, an argument layer, a
dialectical layer, a procedural layer, and finally a probabilistic weighting.
To our knowledge, these approaches have not been implemented so far. Both
papers only contain hand-performed computation on an example as a proof of
concept. The implementation of an ‘argument assistance system’ is left explicitly as
future work.
Another issue is how to determine or verify the probabilities, which are assumed
to be known in advance. Riveret et al. (2007) suggest that maybe in future work,
some kind of statistical analysis of the judge’s past decisions could be performed.
In this paper we tackle the problem by defining a new formalism, called prob-
abilistic argumentation logic, which can be seen as a probabilistic generalization
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of defeasible logic. Our formalism is inspired by Nute (2001)’s defeasible logic,
but instead of using a precedence (priority) relation to settle conflicts between
contradictory defeasible rules, we use explicit assumptions for this purpose. In some
sense, our proposal can also be seen as a form of abductive reasoning (Kakas et al.
1992).
We formalize our approach and implement it in CHRiSM (Sneyers et al. 2010).
CHRiSM is a rule-based probabilistic logic programming language based on
Constraint Handling Rules (Fru¨hwirth 2009) in the host language PRISM (Sato
2008).
Our implementation provides an automation of the probability computations that
were hand-performed in Riveret et al. (2007). The built-in learning algorithm of
CHRiSM also provides a solution to the open problem of determining the initial
probabilities from a given body of precedents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces
CHRiSM. Then, in Section 3 we introduce the approach of Riveret et al. (2007)
and the running example in their paper. We show how this example can be encoded
in CHRiSM. Section 4 introduces our new formalism, probabilistic argumentation
logic. We implement it in CHRiSM. In Section 5 we demonstrate how the CHRiSM
program can be used for learning. Finally we conclude in Section 6.
2 CHRiSM
Constraint Handling Rules (Fru¨hwirth 2009; Sneyers et al. 2010; Fru¨hwirth and
Raiser 2011) is a high-level language extension based on multi-headed rules. Being
a language extension, CHR is implemented on top of an existing programming
language, which is called the host language. An implementation of CHR in host
language X is called CHR(X). Several CHR(Prolog) systems are available.
PRISM (PRogramming In Statistical Modeling) is a probabilistic extension of
Prolog (Sato 2008). It supports several probabilistic inference tasks, including
sampling, probability computation, and expectation-maximization (EM) learning.
In Sneyers et al. (2010), a new rule-based probabilistic logic programming language
was introduced, called CHRiSM — short for CHance Rules induce Statistical
Models. It is based on CHR(PRISM) and it combines the advantages of CHR
and those of PRISM. Like CHR, it is a very concise and expressive programming
language. Like PRISM, it has built-in support for several probabilistic inference
tasks. Furthermore, CHRiSM rules can be freely mixed with CHR rules and Prolog
clauses.
Syntax and Informal Semantics. A CHRiSM program P consists of a sequence of
chance rules. Chance rules rewrite a multiset  of data elements, which are called
(CHRiSM) constraints (mostly for historical reasons). Syntactically, a constraint
c(X1,..,Xn) looks like a Prolog atom: it has a functor c of some arity n and
arguments X1,..,Xn which are Prolog terms. The multiset  of constraints is called
the constraint store or just store. The initial store is called the query or goal, the final
store (obtained by exhaustive rule application) is called the answer or result.
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A chance rule is of the form: “P ?? Hk \ Hr <=> G | B.”, where P is a
probability expression, Hk is a conjunction of (kept head) constraints, Hr is a
conjunction of (removed head) constraints, G is a guard condition (a Prolog goal
to be satisfied), and B is the body of the rule. If Hk is empty, the rule is called a
simplification rule and the backslash is omitted; if Hr is empty, the rule is called a
propagation rule and it is written as “P ?? Hk ==> G | B”. The guard G is optional;
if it is removed, the “|” is also removed. The body B is a conjunction of CHRiSM
constraints, Prolog goals, and probabilistic disjunctions (defined in Sneyers et al.
(2010); we do not need them here).
Intuitively, the meaning of a chance rule is as follows: If the constraint store 
contains elements that match with the head of the rule, and furthermore, the guard G
is satisfied, then we can consider rule application. The subset of  that corresponds
to the head of the rule is called a rule instance. Depending on a coin flip with a
probability given by P, the rule instance is either ignored or it actually leads to
a rule application. Every rule instance may only be considered once. A rule with
probability 1 corresponds to a regular CHR rule; the “1 ??” may be dropped.
Rule application has the following effects: the constraints matching Hr are removed
from the constraint store, and then the body B is executed, that is, Prolog goals are
called and CHRiSM constraints are added into the store.
Operational Semantics. The abstract operational semantics ω??t of a CHRiSM pro-
gram P is given by a state-transition system that resembles1 the abstract operational
semantics ωt of CHR (Sneyers et al. 2010). We refer to (Sneyers et al. 2010) for
the formal definition of ω??t . Just like CHR, CHRiSM can also be given a refined
operational semantics, where conjunctions are evaluated depth-first from left to
right, considering occurrences of the “active” constraint from top to bottom.
Observations. A full observation Q <==> A denotes that there exist a series of
probabilistic choices such that a derivation starting with query Q results in the
answer A. A partial observation Q ===> A denotes that some answer for query Q
contains at least A: in other words, Q ===> A holds iff Q <==> B with A  B.
The following PRISM built-ins can be used to query a CHRiSM program:
• sample Q : execute the query Q while making probabilistic choices;
• prob Q <==> A : compute the probability that Q <==> A holds, i.e. the chance
that the choices are such that query Q results in answer A;
• prob Q ===> A : compute the probability that an answer for Q contains A;
• learn(L) : do expectation-maximization learning from observations L
3 The mad cow example and dialogue games
The running example in Riveret et al. (2007) is the following. John, the proponent,
wants to sue Henry, the opponent, claiming compensation (c) for the damage that
1 If all rule probabilities are 1 — i.e. if the CHRiSM program is actually just a regular CHR
program — then the ω??t semantics boils down to the ωt semantics of CHR.
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Henry’s cow caused to him when he drove off the road to avoid the cow. John argues
that an animal’s owner has to pay damages caused by their animal, that (a) Henry
is the owner of the cow, and that (b) the accident was caused by the need to avoid
the cow (argument A). Henry can counterattack in various ways: he can claim that
(d) the damage was due to John’s negligence (he did not pay sufficient attention to
crossing animals) – argument B – or that (e) it was a case of force majeure: the cow
suddenly went crazy and crossed into the street – argument C. The last objection
could be replied to by using the debated rule that only exogenous events count as
force majeure, and (f) the cow’s madness is endogenous (argument D).
Riveret et al. (2007) assume an abstract argumentation framework (Dung 1995),
which consists of a set of arguments and a binary “defeats” relation. They then
define the notion of a dialogue game which captures the rules of legal argumentation.
A dialogue is a sequence of abstract arguments, in which the proponent and the
opponent alternate, each argument defeats the previous argument, and the proponent
cannot repeat arguments and has to strictly defeat the preceeding argument of the
opponent.
Moreover, each of the arguments has some given “construction chance”, which
is the probability that the judge will actually accept the argument. The aim is to
estimate the overall chance that the case is won.
CHRiSM encoding of the example. For reasons of space, we omit the CHRiSM
encoding of dialogue games with abstract arguments, which are treated as black
boxes that only interact through the “defeats” relation. It can be found in a
companion paper (Sneyers et al. 2013). Here we immediately proceed with a finer
level of granularity.
The arguments in Riveret et al. (2007) consist of premises and rules, which each
have a probability of being accepted by the judge. For example, argument A consists
of the premises that Henry owns the cow (a), and that the accident was caused by
the need to avoid the cow (b), together with the rule “a∧ b → c”, where c stands for
“Henry has to compensate damages”. If a will certainly be accepted, b is accepted
with a probability of 0.9, and the rule “a ∧ b → c” is certainly accepted, then the
overall construction chance of argument A is 1 × 0.9 × 1 = 0.9.
We will call both premises and conclusions “statements” and use ground Prolog
terms to denote them. The auxiliary predicate neg/2 simply negates a literal in a
way that avoids double negations.
We use a dummy predicate begin/0 (to be used as the initial goal). The main
constraint predicate is accept/2, which indicates that the judge conditionally accepts
some statement: accept(S,C) denotes that statement S is accepted if all conditions
C (a Prolog list of statements) hold. If C is the empty list, the statement is
unconditionally accepted; otherwise the acceptance of the statement can still be
retracted if one of the conditions turn out to be unacceptable. If a statement is
already accepted with conditions A, then it is redundant to also accept it with
stronger conditions B ⊇ A.
accept(X,A) \ accept(X,B) <=> subset(A,B) | true.
The above rule implies a set semantics for unconditionally accepted statements.
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A condition is redundant if it is implied by the other conditions:
accept(A,B) \ accept(X,C) <=> select(A,C,D), subset(B,D)|accept(X,D).
If a statement Y was accepted with conditions B, but one of those conditions
is contradicted (“undercut”) by a statement X with weaker conditions A that are
implied by B, then the acceptance of Y has to be retracted — we use a simpagation
rule to remove the accept(Y,B) constraint:
accept(X,A) \ accept(Y,B) <=>
subset(A,B), neg(X,NX), member(NX,B) | true.
Finally, we allow no contradictions:
accept(X,A), accept(Y,B) ==> subset(A,B), neg(X,Y) | fail.
Now we encode the premises and the rules of the arguments:
% Argument A (rule r1, premises a and b):
% "If Henry is the owner of the cow (a) and the accident was caused
by the
% need to avoid the cow (b), then Henry has to compensate
damages (c)."
1.0 ?? accept(a,[]), accept(b,[]) ==> accept(c, [app(r1)]). % r1
1.0 ?? begin ==> accept(a,[]).
0.9 ?? begin ==> accept(b,[]).
The rule being used is a defeasible rule, so its conclusion c will be accepted with
the condition that the rule is actually applicable (app(r1)). This condition can be
“undercut” by arguments B or C.
% Argument B (rule r2, premise d):
% "If John was negligent (d), then r1 is not applicable."
0.8 ?? accept(d,[]) ==> accept(not(app(r1)),[]). % r2
0.5 ?? begin ==> accept(d,[]).
For example, the judge could accept a, b and d and both rules, to reach the state
“accept(c,[app(r1)]), accept(not(app(r1)),[])”. Now the undercutting rule
removes the conditional acceptance of c, because its condition was contradicted.
% Argument C (rule r3, premise e):
% "If the cow was mad (e), it was a case of force majeure.
% so r1 is not applicable."
0.5 ?? accept(e,[]) ==> accept(not(app(r1)), [app(r3)]). % r3
0.2 ?? begin ==> accept(e,[]).
Again, the above rule (r3) is defeasible, so its conclusion can only be accepted with
the condition app(r3), which can be undercut by the final argument:
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% Argument D (rule r4, premise f):
% "If the cow’s madness is endogenous (f), then the ’force majeure’
% rule r3 is not applicable."
0.5 ?? accept(f,[]) ==> accept(not(app(r3)), []). % r4
0.3 ?? begin ==> accept(f,[]).
The only thing now left to do, is to resolve the conditions by making assumptions.
For example, one possible result of the query begin is the following:
accept(a, []), accept(b, []), accept(e, []),
accept(c, [app(r1)]), accept(not(app(r1)), [app(r3)])
In this case, both c and not(app(r1)) are conditionally accepted. Although
not(app(r1)) undercuts the conditions of c, the “undercut” rule is not applicable
(yet) because the condition [app(r3)] is not weaker than the condition [app(r1)].
However, since there is no counter-evidence for app(r3), we can assume this
condition to hold, “promoting” not(app(r1)) to an unconditionally accepted
statement, which then causes the acceptance of c to be retracted.
To implement this idea, we add the following rules at the end of the program:
begin <=> assume.
assume, accept(X,C) ==> select(A,C,D), accept(A,[]) ; true.
assume <=> true.
The middle rule nondeterministically selects conditions and accepts them. This
can either succeed or lead to contradiction (i.e. there is counter-evidence), causing
backtracking.
This concludes the program. We can compute the desired probability – which took
several pages of manual calculations in Riveret et al. (2007) – with a simple query:
?- prob begin ===> accept(c,[]).
Probability of begin ===> accept(c,[]) is: 0.494100000000000
4 Generalization and formalization
In order to generalize the running example, we will propose a transformation from
an arbitrary probabilistic legal argumentation logic A — a notion that will be
introduced in this section — to a CHRiSM program PCHRiSM (A).
4.1 Probabilistic argumentation logic
We use lit(A) to denote the set of literals over a set of atomic formulas A, i.e.
lit(A) = A ∪ {¬a | a ∈ A}. We will sometimes denote conjunctions over literals as
sets since the order of the conjuncts is irrelevant.
Definition 4.1 (Probabilistic argumentation logic)
A probabilistic argumentation logic or PAL is a tuple (S, A, R, P ), where S is a set of
statements and A is a set of assumptions (with S ∩ A = ∅), R is a set of rules, and
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P is a function assigning probabilities to each rule, P : R 
→ [0, 1]. The rules in R
have the following form:
s1 ∧ . . . ∧ sn ⇒ c1 ∧ . . . ∧ cm assuming a1 ∧ . . . ∧ ak
where the left hand side (the antecedent) is a conjunction of literals (si ∈ lit(S ∪ A))
which can be empty (n  0), the right hand side (the consequent) is a non-empty
(m  1) conjunction of literals (ci ∈ lit(S ∪ A), and the part after “assuming”
(the assumption) is a possibly empty (k  0) conjunction of assumption literals
(ai ∈ lit(A)). If the left hand side is empty, the rule is also called a fact and the arrow
can be omitted; if the part after “assuming” is empty, the rule is called unconditional
and the keyword “assuming” can be omitted.
To illustrate the definition, we now write out the running mad cow example as a
formal probabilistic argumentation logic
Amc := ({a, b, c, d, e, f}, {app(r1), app(r3)}, Rmc, Pmc)
where the rules Rmc = {r1, r2, r3, r4, sa, sb, sd, se, sf} are the following:
r1 := a ∧ b ⇒ c assuming app(r1)
r2 := d ⇒ ¬app(r1)
r3 := e ⇒ ¬app(r1) assuming app(r3)
r4 := f ⇒ ¬app(r3)
∀x ∈ {a, b, d, e, f} : sx := x
and the probabilities Pmc are the following:
Pmc := {(r1, 1), (r2, 0.8), (r3, 0.5), (r4, 0.5), (sa, 1), (sb, 0.9), (sd, 0.5), (se, 0.2), (sf, 0.3)}
Now we define an interpretation of a PAL as a set of conditional statements.
Definition 4.2 (Conditional statement)
Given a PAL A = (S, A, R, P ), a conditional statement is a pair (s, C) with s ∈
lit(S ∪ A) and C ⊆ lit(A), such that C is not self-contradictory, that is, there is no
c ∈ A such that both c ∈ C and ¬c ∈ C .
Definition 4.3 (Interpretation)
Given a PAL A, an interpretation is a set I of conditional statements of A such
that if (s, C1) ∈ I and (¬s, C2) ∈ I , then C1 ⊆ C2 and C2 ⊆ C1.
In other words, the conditional statements are not directly contradictory —
although both a statement and its negation can be conditionally accepted at the
same time, as long as the assumptions are different.
Definition 4.4 (Partial Ordering of Interpretations)
We say an interpretation I1 is smaller than an interpretation I2, denoted I1 i I2,
if for all conditional statements (s, c1) ∈ I1, there is a corresponding conditional
statement (s, c2) ∈ I2 such that c1 ⊆ c2.
Note that I1 i I2 implies that the set of statements in I1 is a subset of the
statements in I2, so I1 makes less claims than I2 (which is why we call it smaller),
but the claims in I1 are in a sense stronger since they have a weaker condition.
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We now define the semantics of a PAL, somewhat inspired by the definitions in
Nute (2001), but extending them to take the explicit conditions into account, as well
as the rule selection (which will be needed to introduce the rule probabilities).
Definition 4.5 (Compliant Interpretation w.r.t. Rule Selection)
Given a PAL A = (S, A, R, P ) and a set of selected rules Rs ⊆ R, a compliant
interpretation I w.r.t. the selected rules Rs is a minimal (w.r.t. i) interpretation that
satisfies the following additional criterion:
• if Rs contains a rule r = (Sr ⇒ Cr assuming Ar),
• and ∀s ∈ Sr : ∃c : (s, c) ∈ I (the antecedent is conditionally accepted),
• and ∀a ∈ Ar : ¬∃c : (¬a, c) ∈ I (the assumption is not questioned),
• then for every set {(s1, c1), . . . , (sn, cn)} ⊆ I such that Sr = s1 ∧ . . . ∧ sn, it must
hold that ∀x ∈ Cr : ∃y ⊆ Ar ∪ {c1, . . . , cn} : (x, y) ∈ I (the consequent is
conditionally accepted).
Definition 4.6 (Valid Interpretation w.r.t. Rule Selection)
Given a PAL A = (S, A, R, P ) and a set of selected rules Rs ⊆ R, a valid
interpretation I w.r.t. the selected rules Rs is a compliant interpretation without
gratuitous statements, that is, there is no subset K ⊆ I with K = ∅ such that:
• if Rs contains a rule r = (Sr ⇒ Cr assuming Ar),
• and ∀s ∈ Sr : ∃c : (s, c) ∈ I \ K , and ∀a ∈ Ar : ¬∃c : (¬a, c) ∈ I ,
• then for every set {(s1, c1), . . . , (sn, cn)} ⊆ I \ K such that Sr = s1 ∧ . . . ∧ sn, it
must hold that ∀x ∈ Cr : ∀y ⊆ Ar ∪ {c1, . . . , cn} : (x, y) ∈ K .
Returning to the mad cow example, consider the rule selection Rmc of all rules.
The following is the only valid interpretation w.r.t. Rmc:
{(a, ∅), (b, ∅), (d, ∅), (e, ∅), (f, ∅), (¬app(r1), ∅), (¬app(r3), ∅)}
This is the only valid interpretation w.r.t. R′ = {r1, r3, r4, sa, sb, se, sf}:
{(a, ∅), (b, ∅), (c, ∅), (e, ∅), (f, ∅), (¬app(r3), ∅)}
An interpretation like the above, but with (c, {app(r1)}) instead of (c, ∅) also
satisfies the criterion of Def. 4.5, but it is not compliant because it is not minimal
w.r.t. i. The condition for the acceptance of the consequent of applicable rules is
allowed to be weaker than (i.e. a subset of) the union of all the conditions arising
from the antecedent and assumption. This relaxation serves two goals. Firstly, it
means that if a consequent can be derived in different ways such that it would
be accepted multiple times with varying conditions, it suffices to have only the
weakest conditions in the interpretation. Secondly, because the interpretation has to
be minimal w.r.t. i, conditions will only be present in the interpretation to avoid
contradiction. The following example illustrates this point.
r1 := bird ⇒ flies assuming normal-bird
r2 := tux ⇒ bird ∧ tuxedo-plumage assuming eyes-OK
r3 := tuxedo-plumage ⇒ penguin assuming feathers-make-bird
r4 := penguin ⇒ ¬flies
r5 := tux
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Consider the selection of all rules. The interpretation {(tux, ∅), (¬eyes-OK, ∅)} is
compliant, but it is not a valid interpretation since the statement ¬eyes-OK is
trivially gratuitous: there is not even a rule that could derive it.
The following interpretation satisfies the criterion of Def. 4.5:⎧⎨
⎩
(tux, ∅), (bird, {eyes-OK}), (flies, {eyes-OK, normal-bird}),
(tuxedo-plumage, {eyes-OK}), (penguin, {eyes-OK, feathers-make-bird}),
(¬flies, {eyes-OK, feathers-make-bird})
⎫⎬
⎭
but it is not minimal w.r.t. i; we can relax some conditions to get a minimal
interpretation, for example: (in this case there are three minimal interpretations){
(tux, ∅), (bird, ∅), (flies, {normal-bird}),
(tuxedo-plumage, ∅), (penguin, {eyes-OK}), (¬flies, {eyes-OK})
}
Note that some conditions have to be kept in order to avoid a direct contradiction
between flies and ¬flies. Also note that in the above program, one could replace
r4 with penguin ⇒ ¬normal-bird,¬flies to get rid of these conditions and have
a unique minimal interpretation which contains (¬flies, ∅).
Definition 4.7 (Plausibility of a statement)
Given a PAL A = (S, A, R, P ), a statement literal s ∈ lit(S) is called plausible w.r.t. a
rule selection Rs if all valid interpretations w.r.t. Rs contain a conditional statement
(s, c) for some c.
Definition 4.8 (Acceptability of a statement)
Given a PAL A = (S, A, R, P ), a statement literal s ∈ lit(S) is called acceptable w.r.t.
a rule selection Rs if it is plausible and there exists a valid interpretation w.r.t. Rs
which contains the conditional statement (s, ∅).
In the above example, tux, bird, and tuxedo-plumage are acceptable statements,
while flies, ¬flies, and penguin are plausible but not acceptable. All other literals
are not even plausible.
The probability prob(Rs) of a rule selection Rs ⊆ R is defined as follows:
prob(Rs) =
(∏
r∈Rs
P (r)
)⎛⎝ ∏
r∈R\Rs
1 − P (r)
⎞
⎠
which ensures that
∑
Rs∈P(R) prob(Rs) = 1.
Definition 4.9 (Probability of a statement)
Given a PAL A = (S, A, R, P ), the probability of a statement s ∈ lit(S) is defined as
the sum of the probabilities of all rule selections Rs ∈ P(R) in which s is acceptable.
4.2 Transformation to CHRiSM
We now introduce a transformation from an arbitrary probabilistic argumentation
logic A = (S, A, R, P ) to a CHRiSM program PCHRiSM (A). The transformation
generalizes the example of Section 3. We assume the list predicates member/2,
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subset/2, and append/2 (whose first argument is a list of lists) are defined in the
host language (Prolog).
The transformed program starts with the same four rules as in Section 3. They
ensure that accept/2 encodes an interpretation, redundant conditional statements
are removed, as well as defeated statements. It ends with the rules for the assume
phase as in Section 3.
In between, there are two CHRiSM rules for each rule of A. Each rule r ∈ R:
s1 ∧ . . . ∧ sn ⇒ c1 ∧ . . . ∧ cm assuming a1 ∧ . . . ∧ ak
is transformed into one simple probabilistic CHRiSM rule:
P (r) ?? begin ==> selected(r).
and one non-probabilistic CHRiSM rule:
1 ?? selected(r), accept(s1,C1), . . ., accept(sn,Cn)
==> append([C1, . . ., Cn, [a1, . . ., ak] ], NC),
accept(c1,NC), . . ., accept(cm,NC).
where all literals of the form ¬x are encoded as not(x).
In the example transformation of Section 3, we have combined the selection
and application rules into one probabilistic rule by “unfolding” the selected/1
constraint. This is not sound in general: if a rule can have several instances, or if the
conditional statements in its left hand side can have their condition simplified (e.g.
in the assume phase), the rule should either never fire, or always fire, depending on
whether it was selected or not. For PAL rules where the left hand side statements can
only be inferred unconditionally (in particular, for rules without a left hand side, i.e.
facts), it is sound to do this “unfolding”. This is the case in the mad cow example.
Correctness. It is relatively straightforward to see that when the assume phase starts,
accept/2 encodes an interpretation that satisfies the criterion of Def. 4.5 w.r.t. the
rule selection encoded by selected/1. It also does not contain gratuitous statements.
However, the interpretation is not necessarily minimal. The assume phase searches
for minimal interpretations by nondeterministically relaxing the assumptions. Since
the relaxed accept/2 constraints will cause the transformed PAL rules to be revisited,
the criterion of Def. 4.5 remains satisfied.
Advantages and disadvantages of CHRiSM. We could also attempt to implement
PALs in other probabilistic logic formalisms, like LPAD (Vennekens et al. 2004),
PRISM (Sato 2008), or ProbLog (Kimmig et al. 2011). One approach would be
to implement assumptions using negation-as-failure. For example, the mad cow
example could be expressed as an LPAD program as follows:
c :- r1, a, b, \+ not_app_r1. r1. a. b:0.9.
not_app_r1 :- r2, d. r2:0.8. d:0.5.
not_app_r1 :- r3, e, \+ not_app_r3. r3:0.5. e:0.2.
not_app_r3 :- r4, f. r4:0.5. f:0.3.
and in this simple example, that would work. However, in the general case, explicit
conditions are needed. Consider for example the tux example. In CHRiSM, we
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can use the constraint store to keep track of explicit conditions, and use multi-
headed rules to simplify redundant conditions, retract undercut statements, and
detect contradictions. Combined with standard Prolog search (in the assume rule),
this gives us the expressivity needed to implement PALs in a straightforward way.
The downside of our CHRiSM implementation of PALs is that for probability
computations (and for learning), we are basically generating all possible worlds (rule
selections) and construct full interpretations for each world in a bottom-up (forward
chaining) manner. This approach clearly does not scale well to PAL programs
with a large amount of probabilistic rules, since the number of possible worlds is
exponential in the number of probabilistic rules. In the case of legal reasoning, we
do not think this is a major concern: the total number of rules and claims relevant
to the case should be rather small in practice (after all, at some point all relevant
information has to fit in the mind of the judge, who is only human). Moreover, only
some of the rules and claims will have to be considered as being probabilistic — the
others can be safely assigned a probability of 1 (or 0), so they do not contribute to
the exponential blowup.
5 Learning
For now, we have assumed the probabilities to be known in advance. As mentioned
in the conclusion of (Riveret et al. 2007), an issue is: where do these numbers
come from? They suggest a statistical analysis of known precedents. The CHRiSM
framework gives us exactly the tools needed to do this.
Instead of using fixed probabilities, we can make some or all probabilities
learnable. We can then use a “training set” consisting of the outcomes of earlier
similar cases — we call these the observations — to find a maximum likelihood
probability distribution to fit the observations.
Some of the observations may be full observations, meaning that we not only
know the final outcome, but also how exactly the reasoning went: what statements
were put forward, what statements were accepted or rejected. More realistically,
we only have partial observations: e.g. the final outcome is known, but not the
intermediate steps. In CHRiSM we can use both.
As a proof of concept, let us try to “rediscover” the original probabilities in our
running example. Assume for the sake of the example we have a database of 1100
prior rulings, but we do not have time to read through all of them to find out
exactly what the reasoning was. Say we take 100 random samples and input them
as full observations, like this:
begin <==> accept(not app(r1),[]),accept(d,[]),accept(b,[]),accept(a,[]).
begin <==> accept(d,[]),accept(a,[]).
begin <==> accept(c,[]),accept(b,[]),accept(a,[]),accept(app(r1),[]).
For example, in the first case, even though both a and b were accepted, c was not,
either because rule r1 was not applied – remember, we do not know its probability
– or because its assumption app(r1) was refuted, i.e., d was accepted and rule r2
was applied.
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Table 1. Re-discovering the probabilities with CHRiSM’s learning algorithm
Rule Original probability Learned probability
a 1 0.999999723
b 0.9 0.875267302
d 0.5 0.540243696
e 0.2 0.204545455
f 0.3 0.258644714
r1 1 0.999975929
r2 0.8 0.723429684
r3 0.5 0.547720330
r4 0.5 0.503165649
The remaining 1000 cases are not studied in that much depth: all that was checked
is who won (i.e. was c accepted?) and whether or not statement e (“the cow was
mad”) was accepted. For the four possible combinations, the following counts were
recorded:
62 times begin ===> accept(c,[]), accept(e,[]).
432 times begin ===> accept(c,[]), ~accept(e,[]).
138 times begin ===> ~accept(c,[]), accept(e,[]).
368 times begin ===> ~accept(c,[]), ~accept(e,[]).
In full observations, the right hand side of the large double arrow has to
be exhaustive, so there is no need for explicit negation-as-absence. In partial
observations, explicit negation (denoted by tilde) can be useful, like in the above
example.
The full observations above were obtained by simply taking 100 random samples
(i.e. running the query sample begin) on the original program with the explicit
probabilities; the counts for the partial observations were obtained by computing
the probabilities for each of the four cases and multiplying them by 1000.
Now that we have a training set, we can use the built-in learning algorithm to find
a probability distribution that fits the data. The resulting probabilities are shown in
Table 1; they approximate the original probabilities reasonably well.
6 Conclusion
We have defined probabilistic argumentation logic (PAL) and showed how it can be
used for probabilistic legal reasoning in the style of Riveret et al. (2007). We provided
an implementation of PAL in CHRiSM through a straightforward encoding. Where
previous work only showed by hand-performed examples how the problems could
be solved, we provide a formalism and its encoding in CHRiSM that implements the
problems and automates the generation of solutions. This automation goes much
further than the original problem statement. The resulting CHRiSM program can
be used to compute the probabilities of the possible outcomes, to obtain random
samples, and to learn some or all underlying probabilities, solving an open problem
of (Riveret et al. 2007). We have presented only an academic proof-of-concept of
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the learning method; it would be an interesting topic for future work to apply this
work to real-world data.
For reasons of space, we cannot elaborate on the relationships between PAL and
all the existing proposals for defeasible reasoning, argumentation, abduction, and
non-monotonic logic in general. Preliminary results (Sneyers et al. 2013) indicate
that Nute (2001)’s defeasible logic corresponds to a fragment of PAL. We developed
a transformation from defeasible logic to PAL that is sound and weakly complete.
In future work, the expressiveness of PAL has to be compared to that of other
formalisms.
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